Clustered randomized trials (CRTs) are popular in the social sciences to evaluate the efficacy of a new policy or program by randomly assigning one set of clusters to the new policy and the other set to the usual policy. Often, many individuals within a cluster fail to take advantage of the new policy, resulting in noncompliance behaviors. Also, individuals within a cluster may influence each other through treatment spillovers where those who comply with the new policy may affect the outcomes of those who do not. Here, we study the identification of causal effects in CRTs when both noncompliance and treatment spillovers are present. We first show that the standard analysis of CRT data with noncompliance using instrumental variables does not identify the usual complier average causal effect under treatment spillovers. We extend this result and show that no analysis of CRT data can unbiasedly estimate local network causal effects. Finally, we develop bounds for these network causal effects that only require standard instrumental variables analysis. We demonstrate these results with an empirical study of a new deworming intervention in Kenya. We find that given high levels of compliance, we can place informative bounds on the total effect among compliers and that the deworming intervention reduced infections among those complied with their treatment assignment.
Introduction
Policy interventions are often evaluated by randomized controlled trials as random allocation of policy/treatment removes selection biases. However, there are two well-known complications in such trials. First, an individual's outcome may be influenced by his as well as his peers' treatment assignment, a phenomena known as interference, and spillover effects may occur (Sobel 2006) . To mitigate concerns from spillovers, investigators often use clustered treatment assignments, usually in the form of cluster randomized trials (CRTs), to allow for arbitrary treatment spillovers within clusters (Imbens and Wooldridge 2008) . Second, subjects in the study may not comply with their randomized treatment assignment. For example, some may refuse to take the treatment or seek out treatment contrary to their treatment allocation. The method of instrumental variables (IV) is a well-understood framework to analyze randomized experiments with noncompliance (Angrist and Krueger 2001; Hernán and Robins 2006; Baiocchi et al. 2014) . Increasingly, policy interventions exist at the intersection of these two complexities and our goal is to explore the consequences of spillovers and noncompliances in CRTs.
Our motivation comes from a public health intervention called the Primary School Deworming Project (PSDP) conducted by a Dutch nonprofit organization, International Christelijk Steunfonds Africa (ICS), in cooperation with the Busia District Ministry of Health office (Miguel and Kremer 2004) . The intervention consisted of deworming treatments for intestinal helminths such as hookworm, roundworm, whipworm, and schistosomiasis, delivered to school children in southern Busia, an area in Kenya with the highest helminth infection rates. The study was a CRT, where treatment allocation was clustered at the school level, and as such, all students in treated schools were offered deworming treatments in the form of oral medications. The medication was believed to have both direct and spillover effects. It not only killed helminths among those who took them (i.e. direct effect), but also decreased disease transmission among peers by reducing the number of helminths in the environment (i.e. spillover effect) because students were exposed to intestinal helminths primarily through environmental exposures such as outdoor defecation and contact with infected fresh water.
Also, unit level noncompliance occurred as the investigators were required to obtain parental consent for the study. Even when parental consent was obtained, students in treated schools did not always take the deworming treatments.
There is a large literature on both treatment spillovers and noncompliance, but typically these two topics are studied in isolation. In the literature on noncompliance in CRTs (Frangakis et al. 2002; Small et al. 2008; Jo et al. 2008; Imai et al. 2009; Schochet and Chiang 2011) , treatment spillovers are generally considered a nuisance and their effects are minimized by clustered treatment assignment; Small et al. (2008) even notes that "the issue of interference...does not arise" in CRTs (Section 2.1 of Small et al. (2008) ). In the literature on interference and spillover effects (Sobel 2006; Rosenbaum 2007a; Hudgens and Halloran 2008; Vanderweele 2008; VanderWeele et al. 2013; Aronow and Samii 2017; Bowers et al. 2013) , the primarily focus is on defining or estimating network causal quantities when treatment compliance is perfect. A notable exception is Sobel (2006) who studied noncompliance with interference. However, the study was limited to non-clustered random assignment. It also did not demonstrate how noncompliance and interference affect estimation of specific network estimands, such as spillover effects, defined in Hudgens and Halloran (2008) . Other works include Forastiere et al. (2016) who studied noncompliance and interference under a Bayesian paradigm and Kang and Imbens (2016) and Imai et al. (2018) who studied noncompliance and interference under multi-level designs.
Our contribution is an examination of CRTs when both noncompliance and interference are present. First, we show that the standard analysis of CRTs with noncompliance using the instrumental variables (IV) framework, say following the methods in Small et al. (2008 ) Jo et al. (2008 , and Schochet and Chiang (2011), does not identify the usual causal estimand known as the complier average causal effect (CACE) in the presence of interference. Second, we show more generally that no analysis of CRTs can unbiasedly estimate network effects for noncompliance when interference is present. The second result highlights that CRTs, as an experimental design, are fundamentally unsuited to learn about treatment spillovers in the presence of noncompliance. Third, we show that if investigators already ran CRTs and both noncompliance and interference are present in their studies, they can still derive meaningful bounds on spillover and total effects under an assumption about treatment monotonicity, and these bounds can be computed easily by using estimable quantities from the data.
Preliminaries: Notation and Assumptions

Notation
Suppose there are J clusters indexed by j = 1, . . . , J and for each cluster j, there are n j individuals, indexed by i = 1, . . . , n j . There are N = J j=1 n j total individuals in the study population. Let Z j ∈ {0, 1} denote the treatment assignment of cluster j where Z j = 1 indicates that cluster j was assigned treatment and Z j = 0 indicates that cluster j was assigned control. Let D ji ∈ {0, 1} denote the observed treatment compliance of individual i in cluster j where D ji = 1 indicates that individual i actually took the treatment and D ji = 0 indicates that the individual did not take the treatment (i.e. control). Note that while the treatment is assigned at the cluster level, the decision to comply occurs at the unit level and hence, there is an extra subscript i in D ji . This is important because in the PSDP, schools were assigned to the intervention, but each student and parent in a school could choose to comply with the intervention. Let Y ji ∈ R represent the observed outcome of individual i in cluster j. Let Y = (Y 11 , Y 12 , . . . , Y Jn J ), D = (D 11 , D 12 , . . . , D Jn J ), and Z = (Z 1 , . . . , Z J ) be the outcome, compliance, and treatment assignment vectors, respectively. Let B p = {0, 1} p be the set of all binary vectors of length p. For any vector v ∈ B p and integer k ∈ {1, . . . , p}, let v −k denote the vector v with the kth index removed. Let I(·) denote an indicator function where I(·) = 1 if the event inside the indicator function is true and 0 otherwise.
Potential Outcomes, SUTVA, and Treatment Compliance
We define a causal effect using the potential outcomes notation (Neyman 1923; Rubin 1974) .
jn j ) denote the vector of potential treatment compliances for cluster j. For each z j ∈ {0, 1}, d ji ∈ {0, 1} and
denote individual i's potential outcome if his cluster j were assigned treatment z j , his treatment compliance were d ji , and his peers' treatment compliances were
s potential outcome if his cluster j were assigned treatment z j and he and his peers' treatment compliances were their "natural" compliances D
. . , J, i = 1, . . . , n j } be the set of all potential outcomes, which we assume to be fixed and unknown.
We make a couple of points about the potential outcomes notation. First, the notation assumes partial interference (Sobel 2006) , which is a specific violation of the stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA) (Rubin 1974) . That is, the potential treatment compliance and outcome, D (z j ) ji and Y (z j ,d ji ,d j−i ) ji , are only affected by values from cluster j, specifically z j , d ji , and d j−i . Second, in a CRT, clustered treatment assignment implies that we only observe the potential treatment compliance of individual i in cluster j when all individuals in cluster j are assigned treatment, D we do not observe individual i's potential compliance when some in cluster j are assigned treatment and others are assigned control, say D (0,1,1,...,1) ji . In contrast, Hudgens and Halloran (2008)'s two-stage randomization design allows a fraction of individuals within a cluster to be randomized to the treatment. But, due to unit level noncompliance where only some individuals actually end up taking the treatment, our setting allows a fraction of individuals within a cluster to take the treatment. The key difference is that in Hudgens and Halloran (2008) , treatment taken is assumed to be random by design whereas in our work, treatment taken is inherently non-random due to noncompliance.
Finally, under interference, treatment compliance may be heterogeneous. The extant literature on CRTs with noncompliance has used potential outcomes of the form Y
where the outcome is a function of individual i's own treatment compliance d ji and his cluster treatment assignment z j (Frangakis et al. 2002; Small et al. 2008; Jo et al. 2008; Imai et al. 2009 ; Schochet and Chiang 2011). Our notation here, Y
, is a generalization of prior literature's notation because individual i's potential outcome is affected both by his own compliance d ji and the compliances of his peers d j−i . For example, in a hypothetical cluster of size n j = 2, individual i = 1's potential outcome could be Y
if individual i = 1 actually took the treatment so that D (1) j1 = 1 and individual i = 2 did not so that D
if individual 1 refused treatment so that D (1) j1 = 0. Prior literature's notation would treated these two potential outcomes as equal, Y
. In contrast, our notation makes it explicitly clear that interference exists and is characterized by heterogeneous noncompliance.
Finally, following Rosenbaum (2007b) , Small et al. (2008) , and Hudgens and Halloran (2008) our framework fixes F. This allows for correlations between potential outcomes and compliances possibly due to homophily Christakis and Fowler 2013) , but limits the conclusion of the study to the study participants defined in F.
Review: Assumptions
Next, we state the identification assumptions. These assumptions are standard assumptions in noncompliance/IV and interference; a detailed discussion can be found in Angrist et al. 
Given individual i's compliance d ji and the compliances of others in cluster j d j−i ∈ B n j −1 , the treatment assignment z j has no impact on the potential outcome of individual i.
ji .
(A5) Stratified Interference. Given individual i's compliance d ji , his cluster treatment assignment z j , and k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n j − 1}, the potential outcome of individual i is equivalent when exactly k of his peers are taking the treatment.
We briefly comment on these assumption within the context of the PSDP. Assumption (A1) is approximately satisfied by the design of the PSDP where the deworming intervention was randomized to schools (i.e. clusters); see Hicks et al. (2015) and Miguel and Kremer (2004) for additional details on the treatment assignment process. Assumption (A1) also allow us to test assumption (A2) in the PSDP by simply taking the stratified difference-in-means between the treated clusters' sum of compliance values and the control clusters' sum of compliance values; see Section 5 for a numerical illustration. Assumption (A3), like the usual exclusion restriction, cannot be tested with data because it requires observing potential outcomes under both treatment z j = 1 and control z j = 0; typically, subject-matter expertise must be used to justify this assumption. In the PSDP, (A3) implies that the assignment to deworming treatments had an effect on the outcome, say infection status, only through the receipt of oral medications. If the assignment induced better hygiene that is not captured by the treatment receipt/compliance d ji or d j−i and reduced infection rates, (A3) would be violated.
Assumption (A4) can be interpreted by partitioning the study population into four groups, compliers (CO), always-takers (AT), never-takers (NT), and defiers (DF) (Angrist et al. 1996) . In the PSDP, compliers are students who follow the intervention, D In many CRTs, including the PSDP, assumption (A4) can be satisfied by design where clusters that are not assigned to receive the new intervention (i.e. the control arm) cannot get the intervention (i.e. the treatment arm). This is commonly referred to as one-sided noncompliance and is formalized as assumption (A4.1).
An implication of assumption (A4.1) is that there are no always-takers and defiers in the study population.
Finally, assumption (A5) states that conditional on individual i's compliance to treatment d ji and his cluster treatment assignment z j , individual i's potential outcome Y
depends on the number of individual i's peers who actually took the treatment, not neces-sarily who took the treatment. Hudgens and Halloran (2008) talks about the plausibility of this assumption in practice, especially in infectious disease studies like the PSDP, as well as the statistical importance of having this assumption to estimate variances and conduct asymptotics analyses (Liu and Hudgens 2014) . Note that combining assumptions (A3) and (A5) leads to the original stratified interference assumption stated in Hudgens and Halloran (2008) .
Review: Causal Effects with Noncompliance and Interference
Next, we review two sets of causal effects common in noncompliance and interference. First, under noncompliance, but without interference, the potential outcome Y
and two common causal effects that are estimated from data are the intent-to-treat
ji ) ji and the complier average causal effect (CACE) (Imbens and Angrist 1994; Angrist et al. 1996) , denoted as τ .
In equation (1), N CO is the total number of compliers in the population and the notation
ji assumes (A2)-(A4). The literature also refers to τ as a local effect because it is localized to a subgroup of the population (Imbens and Angrist 1994) . The ITT effect τ Y is identified under (A1) and is estimated by taking the stratified difference-in-means between the treated clusters' sum of outcome values and the control clusters' sum of outcome values;
see Section 4 for details. The CACE τ is identified under (A1)-(A4) and is estimated by taking the ratio of estimated τ Y and τ D . This ratio is typically known as "the" IV estimator in the literature and is the de-facto estimator for CACE in CRTs with noncompliance.
However, under interference, it is unclear whether this standard estimator for τ identifies CACE; we explore this in Section 3.2.
Second, under stratified interference (A5), but with full compliance (or (A3)), the po-
and common causal effects of interest are the total, direct, and spillover effects, denoted as TE ji , DE ji , and PE ji , respectively (Hudgens and Halloran 2008) . In particular, given two compliances of individual i's peers
the total, direct, and spillover/peer effects are defined as 3 Identification
Target Causal Estimands
To discuss the results in the paper, we introduce three causal estimands which may be of natural interest in CRTs with both noncompliance and interference and, to the best of our knowledge, have not been discussed in either literature on noncompliance or interference.
Broadly speaking, the three causal estimands are the network estimands in Hudgens and Halloran (2008) specific to subgroups of compliers, always-takers, and never-takers in Angrist et al. (1996) .
To begin, let n CO j be the number of compliers in cluster j, n AT j be the number of alwaystakers, and n NT j be the number of never-takers. For each cluster j, we define the average total casual effect of the treatment among compliers (CO)
where k 1 > k 0 . In the PSDP, TE CO j (1, k 1 ; 0, k 0 ) is the average causal effect of a complier student i along with k 1 of his peers taking the deworming medication versus him not taking the medication while k 0 of his peers take the medication. We expect that TE CO j (1, k 1 ; 0, k 0 ) > 0 in PSDP, that is the deworming treatment has a net positive benefit to students who comply with the assignment.
Also, for each cluster j, we define the average spillover effect of the treatment among always-takers (AT)
where k 1 > k 0 . In the PSDP, PE AT j (1, k 1 ; 1, k 0 ) is the average causal effect of k 1 of an alwaystaker student i's peers taking the treatment versus k 0 of his peers taking the treatment.
It can be thought of as the additional effect of having k 1 − k 0 always-takers' friends take the treatment on the always-takers' outcomes. If PE AT j (1, k 1 ; 1, k 0 ) = 0, having additional k 1 − k 0 of always-takers' peers take the deworming medication does not affect the always-
peers take the deworming medication is beneficial to the always-takers' outcomes. In the PSDP, we expect PE AT j (1, k 1 ; 1, k 0 ) ≥ 0, that is more peers taking the deworming medication is not harmful to the students who always take the treatment.
Finally, we define a parallel effect to PE AT j (1, k 1 ; 1, k 0 ), the average spillover effect among never-takers for cluster j
where k 1 > k 0 . In the PSDP, PE NT j (0, k 1 ; 0, k 0 ) is the causal effect of k 1 of a never-taker student i's peers taking the deworming medication versus k 0 of his peers taking medication. Like the spillover effect among always-takers in equation (3), PE NT j (0, k 1 ; 0, k 0 ) can be thought of as the additional effect of having k 1 − k 0 of never-takers' peers take the treatment on the never-takers' outcomes. The spillover effect among never-takers may be useful in practice because it helps investigators understand the spillover effect of the new treatment among individuals who will never take the treatment irrespective of the intervention assignment or, in clustered encouragement designs (Frangakis et al. 2002) , various encouragements that are used to encourage treatment uptake behavior. For example, in the PSDP, the never-takers are students who would never take the new medication despite the study intervention. They may choose to not take the medication due to fear of side effects, apathy towards new medical treatments, or general skepticism about new medication. Understanding how the treatment spills over to these never-takers could be useful for informing health policy, say by understanding the effect of herd immunity among individuals who refuse to take the treatment.
Standard IV Analysis Does Not Identify CACE
Our first identification result states the standard IV analysis of CRT data with noncompliance by taking the ratio of the ITT effect with the compliance effect (see Sections 2.4 and 4)
does not identify the CACE when interference is present. This result highlights that investigators who ignore interference in CRTs with noncompliance and instead naively conduct the standard analysis can obtain misleading conclusions. (1) becomes a mixture of causal effects among compliers, always-takers and never-takers.
Theorem 1 states that under interference, τ is no longer the CACE and hence, the usual estimator for τ , say the IV estimator in Section 2.4, no longer estimates the CACE. To understand what τ becomes under interference, consider again the definitions of spillover and total effects in Section 3.1. Spillover effects fix individuals' own treatment assignments, but vary their friends' treatment assignments. Hence, to observe spillover effects under noncompliance, individuals must always take the treatment (or control) irrespective of the intervention assignment; this allows the treatment received to be fixed under all cluster treatment allocations, z j = 1 and z j = 0. In contrast, total effects vary individuals and their peers' treatment assignments. To observe total effects under noncompliance, individuals must comply with their treatment assignments so that there is variation in their treatment receipts. Combined together, the effect definitions show that spillover effects PEs are asso-ciated with always-takers AT and never-takers NT whereas total effects TEs are associated with compliers CO in equation (5). Also, since each cluster has a mixture of compliers, never-takers, and always-takers and spillover effects may not be zero under interference, τ becomes a combination of effects from the subgroups in equation (5). This intuition also suggests that, generally speaking, spillover effects among compliers or total effects among never-takers and always-takers may not be identifiable in CRTs with noncompliance.
We can also express τ in equation (5) in terms of population average effects, similar to population average effects in Hudgens and Halloran (2008) . Let TE CO (1; 0) be the population average total effect among compliers, PE AT (1) be the population average spillover effect among always-takers, and PE NT (0) be the population average spillover effect among nevertakers.
PE ji (0, n AT j + n CO j ; 0, n AT j )I(ji is NT)
Then, τ can be written as a linear combination of population average effects, i.e.
Next, Corollary 1 states the form of τ under one-sided noncompliance in assumption (A4.1).
Corollary 1. Suppose the assumptions in Theorem 1 hold except we replace (A4) with (A4.1). Then, n AT j = 0 for all j and τ becomes
We take a moment to relate our results to those in the literature on interference and noncompliance. First, a key difference between the population effects that make up τ and those in Hudgens and Halloran (2008) is that Hudgens and Halloran (2008) studied contrasts between two treatment policies in the population, say treatment policy 1 that assigns 50% of individuals in a cluster to treatment, and treatment policy 2 that assigns 30% of individuals in a cluster to treatment, and their population average effects averaged over all individuals in the study. In our case, because of noncompliance, each cluster may have different number of people who actually took the treatment. Also, our population average effects TE CO (1; 0), PE AT (1), and PE NT (0) averaged over subgroups of the population. Our population average effects become those in Hudgens and Halloran (2008) if everyone in the study is a complier.
Specifically, under this case, the population average effects would become contrasts between two treatment policies, one where everyone in a cluster is treated and one where everyone is not treated and τ reduces to the population average total effect of Hudgens and Halloran (2008) . Second, Theorem 1 can be seen as a generalization of the classical identification results of CACE (Imbens and Angrist 1994; Angrist et al. 1996 ) that allows for interference.
In particular, without interference, the spillover effects in τ equal zero, the total effect is the direct effect (Hudgens and Halloran 2008) and τ in Theorem 1 reduces to the CACE.
We briefly discuss the relationship between instrument strength and our identification result. Broadly speaking, an instrument is strong when there are more compliers than nevertakers or always-takers so that N NT /N CO ≈ 0 and N AT /N CO ≈ 0 and τ D is far away from 0. When the instrument is strong, τ in Theorem 1 mainly represents the compliers in the population, specifically their total effects. However, suppose the instrument is weak; there are more never-takers or always-takers than compliers so that N NT /N CO or N AT /N CO are far away from zero. Then, τ may predominantly represent the always-takers or never-takers in the population and the effects among compliers may make up a small portion of τ .
Unbiased Estimation of Network Effects is Impossible
Previous section showed that the standard IV method failed to identify the causal quantities discussed in Section 3.1 in CRTs with noncompliance and interference; it identifies mixtures of effects. Next, we address whether any analysis can be informative about these causal quantities by showing that there are no unbiased estimators for them.
Formally, consider again the estimands defined in Section 3.1, the total effect among compliers, TE CO (1; 0), and the spillover effects among always-takers and never-takers, PE AT (1) and PE NT (0), respectively. Unbiased estimators exist for the denominators of these quantities; see Section 4 for details. Hence, to learn more about total and spillover effects from data, we need to be able to estimate the numerator of these quantities. The numerator of these quantities are also sums of individual total and spillover effects among their respective subgroups.
PE ji (0, n AT j + n CO j ; 0, n AT j )I(ji is NT) (10) 
Bounds under Non-Negative Treatment Effects
Taken pessimistically, Sections 3.2 and 3.3 showed that learning about network treatment effects in Section 3.1 is hopeless with CRTs when treatment spillovers and noncompliance are present and perhaps, investigators who already ran CRTs, like those from the PSDP, should limit their analysis to ITT effects. This section shows that this pessimism towards ITT effects is not always warranted and CRTs may still yield useful information about network treatment effects under the partial identification framework. In particular, in CRTs with one-sided noncompliance, if we assume the treatment is not harmful to the individual and his peers, it is possible to calculate informative bounds on the total effect among compliers and the spillover effect among never-takers.
Formally, a treatment is not harmful, or has non-negative total and spillover effects, if the following hold.
We note that assumption (A6) is similar to an assumption by Choi (2017) about treatment monotonicity. In the PSDP, assumption (A6) is reasonable because it is unlikely that exposure to deworming treatments would increase the presence of infection. Also, in the PDSP, the study incorporated one-sided noncompliance by design.
Let y = TE CO (1; 0) and x = PE NT (0). Then, we can write τ as
Equation (12) suggests that an inverse relationship between the total average effect among compliers and the spillover average effect among never-takers. Specifically, as the spillover average effect becomes positive, the total average effect must become negative. Moreover, by (A6) and one-sided noncompliance, y ≥ 0 and x ≥ 0, which along with equation (12) gives us bounds on both the total and the spillover effect.
The boundaries of the bounds in equation (13) If the outcome is binary, we can impose tighter constraints on both equations (12) and (13) as follows.
and
In equation (16), the bound for the spillover effect PE NT (0) becomes tighter as the number of never-takers increases and exceeds the number of compliers. If, however, the number of compliers increased and exceeded the number of never-takers, then we have a tighter bound for the total effect TE CO (1; 0). This is in agreement with Theorem 1 where τ is a weighted mixture of subgroup effects and the weights are proportional to the number of individuals in each subgroup. When τ = 1.25, the spillover effect among never-takers is always bounded away from zero; more generally, if τ > 1, the lower bound on the spillover effect is always bounded away from zero. The upper bound depends on the compliance rate, with higher compliance resulting in wider bounds on the spillover effect. However, if the compliance rate is very high and reaches the absolute maximum of τ , we reach a point where there are tight bounds for both the spillover and the total effect. This is because for a binary Y , τ is bounded above by 1 + N NT /N CO and therefore, high compliance rates coupled with τ > 1 would force the average effect among never-takers and compliers to be closer to 1, the maximum possible value.
The numerical example suggests that for CRTs with one-sided noncompliance where assumption (A6) is plausible, informative analysis is possible for spillover and total treatment effects. As a general rule of thumb for binary Y , with τ > 1 and a high compliance rate, we can obtain tight bounds on both the total and spillover effects. If τ > 1 and the compliance rate is low, then we can obtain tight bounds on the spillover effect, but not the total effect.
If τ < 1 and the compliance rate is high, then we can also obtain tight bounds on the total effect, but not the spillover effect. If τ < 1 and the compliance rate is low, then we can obtain tight upper bounds on both the total and spillover effects.
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We now outline how to estimate the bounds in Section 3.4, specifically τ , N CO and N NT .
Under assumptions (A1), these estimators are unbiased for N CO and N NT . (iii) p CO ∈ (0, 1), p NT ∈ (0, 1), τ D , and τ Y are fixed for every J. Then,
Conditions (i) and (ii) in Theorem 3 are standard asymptotic regimes for CRTs where the number of clusters go to infinity while the cluster size remains fixed; Kang and Keele (2018) shows that in the opposite asymptotic regime where the number of clusters remain fixed, but the cluster size goes to infinity, typical CRT estimators exhibit poor properties.
Condition (iii) follows Chapter 4.4 of Lehmann (2004) where in finite sample settings, the asymptotic embedding sequence has the same mean for every N ; this type of asymptotics has been used in noncompliance settings (Baiocchi et al. 2010) . Condition (iii) is technical in that it allows us to approximate the behavior of the estimators in a mathematically tractable fashion. Theorem 3 can be extended to handle non-binary outcomes outlined in equation (13) under appropriate growth conditions on the outcome. We will use Theorem 3 as a basis for constructing bounds in our empirical example in Section 5.
While Theorem 3 provides a consistent estimator for the bounds, it does not characterize uncertainty. As is typical, our bounds are partially based on minimum (min) and maximum (max) operators, and the sample estimates of bounds based on these operators will tend to be narrower than the true bounds Pepper 2009, 2000) . In addition, the presence of min or max operators makes it difficult to derive a closed form expression for the asymptotic distribution of bounds, and bootstrap techniques are generally invalid as well (Hirano and Porter 2012; Andrews and Guggenberger 2009; Andrews 2000; Romano and Shaikh 2008; Romano 1989; Romano and Shaikh 2010) . See Tamer (2010) for an overview.
One solution is to assume an infinite population model with independent and identically distributed observables. Under an IID infinite population model, Cheng and Small (2006) used the percentile bootstrap method of Horowitz and Manski (2000) to construct confidence intervals for bounds based on IV. However, in our application, the assumption of an infinite population model is unrealistic given the clustered treatment assignment mechanism and the small number of clusters.
In response to these issues, we use Chernozhukov et al. (2013) which developed methods for bias-corrected estimators and confidence intervals for intersection bounds under more general sampling mechanisms. The Chernozhukov-Lee-Rosen (CLR) approach uses precisioncorrected estimates of the terms in the bounding functions before applying the min and max operators. The CLR approach to estimation is half-median unbiased. This implies that the upper bound estimator exceeds the true value of the upper bound with probability at least one half asymptotically; with the same being true of the lower bound estimator. The CLR approach does depend on the estimators of the bounding functions being consistent and asymptotically normally distributed. As we showed above, our derived bounding functions are consistent and asymptotically normal. In Section 5, we apply the CLR approach to estimate the bounds and confidence intervals.
The Effect of Deworming in the Presence of Noncompliance and Spillovers
The initial analysis of the PSDP intervention focused on estimating ITT effects, specifically the direct effect of the deworming intervention and the treatment spillover effects (Miguel and Kremer 2004) ; the original analysis did not include any analyses that focused on treatment effects. Nevertheless, the original data included detailed measures of whether students complied with cluster-level treatment assignment. In our analysis, we use an updated version of the data that corrected a series of data errors in the original data (Aiken et al. 2015; Hicks et al. 2015) . In our analysis, we focus on the primary outcome from the original study, which was a binary indicator for the presence of a helminth infection.
First, we carry out the standard IV analysis, which is what an investigator may naively try with CRT data with noncompliance, falsely assuming that effects from treatment spillovers are mitigated due to clustered treatment assignment. Using the method in Kang and Keele (2018) (0) As a reminder, in the PSDP study, compliance was one-sided and the primary outcome was binary. Therefore, we can plug in estimates of N NT , N CO , andτ into equation (13) to estimate the bounds. In the PDSP intervention, the instrument is fairly strong: average student compliance in schools assigned to treatment was 82%. As such, the number of compliers is high relative to the number of never-takers, which indicates we should be able to obtain relatively informative bounds on TE CO (1; 0), but not on PE NT (0; 0). The estimated half-median unbiased bounds on TE CO (1; 0) are -0.198 and -0.414 and the CLR bias-corrected 95% confidence intervals for the bounds are -0.062 and -0.542. Thus among compliers, we can be 95% confident that the reduction in infections was as small as 6% or as high as 54%.
Next, we calculated the bound for PE NT (0; 0). The estimated bounds are 0 and 1. This is not surprising given the paucity of never-takers relative to compliers in the data.
Conclusion
In this paper, we studied CRTs with both noncompliance and treatment spillovers. In many public health interventions, subjects may refuse treatments but are partially exposed when other subjects take the treatment. In the PSDP, some students did not take the medications that comprised the treatment. However, infection levels may be lower for these unexposed students as peers who took the treatment lowered their likelihood of environmental exposure to helminths.
We showed that causal estimands of interest cannot be estimated under the standard assumptions used under both noncompliance and interference. The standard IV analysis leads to identifying mixture of causal effects instead of the usual complier average causal effect. We extended the result to show that unbiased estimation of key components of the causal estimands in Section 3.1 is impossible. Finally, we showed that investigators must rely on partial identification methods to place bounds on these quantities. While partial identification results often produce wide bounds that are uninformative, we showed that in the PSDP data, the bounds are informative even once sampling uncertainty is accounted for.
The bounds depend strongly on the ratio of compliers to noncompliers. As such if the total effect among compliers is of primary interest, investigators can sharpen the bounds by designing interventions that maximize compliance with assigned treatment status. In fact, full compliance with assigned treatment status is the most direct way to eliminate the lack of point identification. However, if the effect among never-takers is of greater interest, the design of the intervention could focus less on encouraging compliance. In general, increasing compliance may be easier than reducing compliance, which implies that it may be difficult to sharpen the bound for the spillover effect among never-takers. We start by decomposing the term Y
Under stratified interference, we can decompose the term Y Then, summing these quantities over all clusters give you the sum of total effects and spillover effects for different subgroups CO, AT, and NT. Dividing this quantity τ D , which constitutes the total number of compliers in the population, and appropriate scaling factor gives the desired result.
Proof of Theorem 2. First, we work with TE CO sum (1; 0), which simplifies to
Suppose there exists an unbiased estimator T (Y, D, Z) for TE CO sum (1; 0), Thus, the unbiased estimator T (·) cannot exist.
Proof of Theorem 3. The proof proceeds in two steps. We first show that the estimators τ and N CO N NT are consistent Second, we utilize the continuous mapping theorem to show that the estimators for the bounds are consistent.
First, under (A1), the numerators and denominators that make up τ , τ Y and τ D are unbiased for τ Y and τ D , respectively. Let Y (1)
